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The topic of transsexualism was most prominently brought into the feminist movement's
consciousness through the critical work of cultural radical feminist Janice Raymond. In
this paper I will argue that the original response given by trans theorists to Raymond's
critiques has allowed for the propagation of certain mistaken notions about trans people.
In order to correct these misconceptions a different tack must be taken in responding to
Raymond. I will begin by overviewing how two schools of feminist thought have lent
themselves to theories of transsexualism, then focusing on radical feminist critique by
Janice Raymond and a post-structural feminist response by theorist Sandy Stone. I will
then outline how I propose to correct the oversights presented in Stone's response. I will
clarify my reason for stating that the original response to critics conflicts with other
feminist aims, and will conclude by arguing how to correct the original response's
problematic misunderstanding of the factors which motivate peoples' transitions.
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I. Introduction
Transsexualism first arose in the American public consciousness in the 1950's
with Christine Jorgensen's highly publicized transition from male to female. While
physical transitions nearly always include some combination of hormone replacement
therapy and sex reassignment surgeries, it is difficult to describe the exact course that any
individual's physical transition will take, and it is similarly difficult to define exactly
what transsexualism is. To some, a transsexual person is “a person in need of physical
alteration so that his or her body fits his or her mind" (Sullivan, 4); a felt sense of one's
body delivers a certainty about their identity, resulting in a powerful conviction that one
is either a man or a woman, producing a feeling of dissonance between one's brain and
their body which calls for physical modification" (Salamon, 82). Some definitions of the
word limit its scope to only include those who have already undergone physical changes,
maintaining that the word transsexual must only be used to refer to individuals who have
already used hormonal and/or surgical technologies to alter their bodies. For instance,
Susan Stryker notes that the term "transsexual" has historically signified “somebody who
permanently changed genitals in order to claim membership in a gender other than the
one assigned at birth” (Stryker, 4). However, as Henry Rubin aptly points out, "surgery,
when it does appear in trans1 narratives, is a means of becoming what one already
considers oneself to be, not the point of definition of oneself as transsexual" (266). Rubin
believes that one is already transsexual before undergoing surgery, that the act of
modification itself is not an important delineation upon which to decide whether one is or
is not trans. Thus while some definitions require that one have already undergone some

1 In current literature it is common for "transsexual" and "transgender" to hold separate meanings. When
distinction between these two words is not necessary, or when talking about both groups simultaneously,
theorists commonly use the shortened "trans".
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type of medical intervention to be considered transsexual, others only require one to have
felt an internal dissonance or desire to transition. I share Rubin's intuitions on this
subject, and in his vein, I find definitions requiring one to have already undergone
medical interventions to be unnecessarily restrictive. I can see no important difference
between situations where one has or has not actually undergone these modifications, so
long as the desire to do so is still present. Thus, my own definition of the word
"transsexual" will be some combination of those presented, signifying someone who has
experienced feelings of dissonance or dissociation about their sexed characteristics and
who seeks to change them (or is changing them) through medical means such as hormone
replacement therapy or surgery.
In this paper I will argue that the original response given to feminist critiques of
transsexualism has allowed for the propagation of certain mistaken notions about trans
people; in order to correct these misconceptions a different tack must be taken in
responding to these critiques. I will begin by overviewing how two schools of feminist
thought have theorized transsexualism, first focusing on a radical feminist critique by
Janice Raymond. I will then outline the post-structural feminist response by theorist
Sandy Stone and show how this response addressed one of two objections raised by
Raymond. However, Stone's response still perpetuated misunderstandings about trans
people, and in Section III I will outline how I propose to correct the oversights presented
in Stone's response. In Section IV I will outline my reason for stating that the original
response to critics conflicts with other feminist aims: since the current conception of
"transgender" responds to Raymond by asserting that transgender people are gender nonconforming, it tacitly necessitates and reinforces problematic statements about women
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(and men) which are only true by virtue of their social standing. As such, the current
conception violates a guideline defended by Sally Haslanger. In order to resolve this
tension with Haslanger while still responding to Raymond, I propose that we instead
maintain that trans people are neither categorically gender conforming nor gender nonconforming. I will then move in Section V to argue why we must correct the original
response's failure to address the misunderstanding of motivations behind physical
transitions. I believe that this is a more pressing argument to pursue since failing to
address this point means a continued failure to realize that a biological component
motivates physical transitions. The current misinterpretation allows for problematic
normative evaluations of physical transitions, which conflicts with our intuitions about
what acts can or should be viewed as bearing some ethical or political imperative. So
long as transitions are believed to be born out of a social motive theorists will continue to
judge physical transitions by their political effects. I will thus explain how to correct the
original response's problematic misunderstanding of the factors motivating peoples'
transitions.
II. Feminism’s Responses to Trans
Feminist theorists have long studied the roles and behaviors ascribed to the sexes
and sought to describe the female condition, or what it means to live as a woman in
society. Different schools of thought in feminist theory value different concepts and
aims, and they have developed their own distinct approaches to addressing issues. In this
paper I will be focusing on the issue of transsexualism in particular, and will use a
detailed analysis of the conceptual backgrounds informing cultural radical and poststructural feminisms to explain how different approaches have been shaped by their
theoretical origins. First, I will address what sources cultural radical feminists took to be
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the causes of gender-based oppression and the steps they believed were necessary to
overcome this oppression. I will then go on to describe how these visions of gender and
women's nature informed the work of Janice Raymond and her analysis of
transsexualism. I will then move on to post-structuralist feminism and detail its main
ideas, specifically the concept of performativity, concluding by showing how Sandy
Stone uses the notion of performativity to theorize transsexualism.
Cultural Radical Feminism
One school of thought analyzing the different issues affecting women's lives was
radical feminism, a strain which held that women's oppression as women was the
fundamental oppression. They viewed sexism as the first, most widespread and deepest
form of human subjugation, with men’s oppression of women then serving to produce
other systems of human domination (Tong, 51). Radical feminists believed that women's
subordination under a patriarchal society is the root of women's oppression and they
commonly hold as their main goal an eradication of this condition. However, an
important distinction should be made between libertarian and cultural radical feminisms
(Tong, 54). Libertarian radical feminists believe that in order to eliminate male control,
men and women would have to eliminate gender as it has been construed under
patriarchy, and androgyny, or a blending of male and female natures, presents as the best
way of meeting this aim (Tong, 54). However, cultural radical feminists depart from this
viewpoint. They instead believe it necessary to preserve the distinct and essential
feminine nature, asserting that to do so was not only beneficial, but necessary to
eradicating oppression. As distinct from their libertarian counterparts, cultural feminists
generally sought to celebrate femaleness and organized women around the principle of
female difference (Bell, 157). Some cultural radical feminists even went so far as to

5

attribute male-female differences to biology, using an essentializing tactic to reinforce
their assertion that feminine traits were separate from (and better than) their masculine
counterparts (Tong, 58). Thus, cultural feminists "see the primary goal of feminism as
freeing women from the imposition of so-called 'male values,' and creating an alternative
culture based on 'female values'" (Willis, 117). To them the preservation of the female
essence was necessary to combat patriarchy and gender-based oppression; the segregation
and conservation of female values from male values was essential to their project.
Another concept of particular importance to the cultural radical feminist project
was the act of consciousness raising. Consciousness raising was introduced as a way for
women to cultivate and nurture their alternative female consciousness, allowing them to
come together and talk about their personal experiences as women (Tong, 51). Through
this practice they sought to meet their goals of defeating patriarchy and eradicating
gender-based oppression (Bell, 157). Cultural radical feminists believed that there was “a
lot of sense in listening to each other and in being willing to understand the meaning of
other women’s experience”, and that consciousness raising would allow a woman to
"arrange the patterns of [their] lives into political shapes”; it allowed women to discover
similarities they could bond over and collectively unite in the name of, and enabled them
to find unifying elements amongst their individual lives (Bell, 483). For cultural radical
feminists consciousness raising presented a way to illustrate how the personal is political,
and this tactic was ultimately fundamental to realizing their political goals (Bell, 152).
Janice Raymond
The topic of transsexualism was most prominently brought into the feminist
movement's consciousness through the work of cultural radical feminist Janice Raymond,
with her book The Transsexual Empire, showing clear theoretical roots in this particular
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feminist tradition. Evidence of her background can be seen by the fact that she grounds
her views as necessary to eliminate the patriarchy and gender-based oppression. Her
framework also maintains the notion of separate male/female consciousnesses, and
stresses the importance of consciousness raising as a means to combating sexism.
Raymond interprets transsexualism as another iteration of the patriarchy and
oppressive gender system. It is merely another way in which men flaunt their control over
women. To her, transsexualism demonstrates how men wield so much control in society
that they can even claim to become women and exploit those claims to exert authority
within all-women spaces (Raymond 1979, xviii).2 Raymond considers transsexualism to
be caused primarily by the sex-role stereotyping of society; she believes that it results
directly from patriarchy and only serves to perpetuate its harmful effects. She states that,
as opposed to reaching true liberation in their transitions, “the transsexual only exchanges
one stereotype for the other, thus reinforcing the fabric by which a sexist society is held
together” (Raymond, xviii). By letting the transsexual undergo their transition we are
indulging our patriarchal society, allowing its effects to run rampant and unchecked.
In addition to these discussions of patriarchy and gender-based oppression, the
concept of consciousness raising also figures importantly into Raymond’s arguments. In
this respect Raymond's stance echoes the voices of theorists before her. Suzanne Kessler
and Wendy McKenna similarly credit the urge to transition to a "false consciousness"
caused by the internalization of our patriarchal society and its strict gender roles. They
view transsexualism as "a category constructed to alleviate ambiguity - to avoid the kinds
of combinations (e.g. male genitals-female gender identity) that make people
2

The majority of Raymond's critique focuses on transsexual women devoting very little time to discussing
transsexual men. However, she still believes that transsexual men transition as a result of patriarchal
society; their desire to transition is motivated by a desire to possess male privilege.
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uncomfortable because they violate the basic rules about gender....In a society that could
tolerate lack of correspondence, there would be no transsexuals" (Kessler and McKenna,
1978, 120). In such passages we see a stance echoed by Raymond, the belief that
transsexualism only occurs because people are uncomfortable living outside of society's
gender norms. If society were only more comfortable with people acting outside of strict
predetermined and prescribed roles, these theorists collectively believe, then
transsexualism would cease to exist.
True to cultural radical form, Raymond believed that consciousness-raising would
allow transsexuals to resolve their conflicts with themselves without needing to resort to
medical intervention. Raymond thought that if they would forego surgery and hormones
and instead opt for peer support and encouragement to deal with this "particular
manifestation of gender deviancy,” joining environments which allowed them to
“transcend cultural definitions of both masculinity and femininity, without changing
[their] bod[ies]”, they would see that their planned actions were unnecessary and
misguided (Raymond, 183). Ultimately Raymond believes that more accepting attitudes
towards gender roles would allow transsexuals to see that they are not women, but rather
deviant males; if transsexuals simply talked to and found solidarity with others similarly
frustrated by the patriarchy and its effects, they would realize their feelings were
commonplace occurrences and would no longer feel the need to impersonate women
through surgery and other medical interventions (Raymond, 183).
Given these statements, we can summarize Raymond's critique as making two
main assertions. She states both
(1) That transsexuals problematically cling to strict gender roles, and
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(2) That transsexuals transition as a result of patriarchal pressure (1979,
16).
Post-Structural Feminism
However, cultural radical feminism has not been the only strain of feminist
thought to address transsexualism. Other authors have found post-structural feminism to
be integral to their theories. Post-structural feminism3 arose out of works by French
feminists like Simone de Beauvoir and found its establishing ideology in the self/Other
distinction, a concept used to highlight how women have been denied the “default” status
afforded to man and forced into the status of merely “other”. However, while Beauvoir
believed woman’s role as Other was ultimately a negative condition to have to endure, an
imposition women should work to rid themselves of, postmodern feminism strips this
status of its negative connotations and instead views it as a condition to be celebrated.
Postmodern theories disregarded this status as something worth avoiding and instead
focused on the positives it could afford, believing that “otherness … is more than an
oppressed condition. It is also a way of being, thinking, and speaking allowing for
openness, plurality, diversity, and differences” (Tong, 192).
In a marked departure from cultural radical feminism, postmodern feminists
refuse to search for the "base" or "root" of women's oppression, not caring to develop an
overarching explanation and solution for women's subjugation, even rejecting any mode
of thought which aims to provide a single explanation for why women are oppressed or
the steps necessary to achieve liberation (Tong 192). They instead undertake other
projects, such as the rejection of phallocentric thought, or the rejection of the idea that
3

There is certainly a distinction to be made between post-structuralist and postmodern feminisms. In fact,
Butler speaks out against the conflation between these two movements (See: Tong, 192). However, I will
be using these terms - "post-structuralist" and "postmodern" - synonymously.
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there is one objective reality. Post-structuralist theorists argue that objective and universal
truths do not exist, that particular forms of knowledge have merely become naturalized in
culturally specific ways (Sullivan, 39). They also call for the destabilization of norms and
are typically critical of grand narratives, or the idea that everyone in a particular social
group must have gone through a single shared experience (Sullivan, 40).
However, while all of these notions are characteristic of post-structuralist
feminism, the concept which is perhaps most important to their approach is that of
performativity. A performative speech act can be defined as one which, itself, is the
actual doing of the action. For instance, saying "I do" is the performative speech act
through which one is married, and saying "today I am a man" is the act through which
one is bar mitzvahed. For a greater explanation of performativity and how it relates to
transsexualism, we can turn to post-structuralist Judith Butler.
Butler has written extensively on the topics of gender and sexuality, and in her
seminal text Gender Trouble, she challenges what had henceforth been seen as a
necessary connection between sex, gender, and sexuality. Butler claimed that there is no
necessary connection between a person’s sex and a person’s gender, rejecting the idea
that a biological female (one who possesses XX chromosomes) will inevitably display
feminine traits and desire men as her sexual partners (Tong, 201). She believes that "to
choose a gender is to interpret received gender norms in a way that organizes them anew.
Less a radical act of creation, gender is a tacit project to renew one's cultural history in
one's own terms. This is not a prescriptive task we must endeavor to do, but one in which
we have been endeavoring all along" (Tong, 201). It is important to note that Butler does
not view gender as a choice, something that can be freely chosen or disregarded.
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However, she does believe that identity is performatively constituted in and through
relations with others and with a world, and gender is "a tenuous identity constituted in
and through 'the stylized repetition of acts'", maintaining that one's gender is neither as
concrete nor as inevitable as previously thought (Sullivan, 85).
True to form, Judith Butler saw trans people as embodying these postmodern
concepts, most notably the notion of performativity. She analyzes the occurrence of drag
most famously, citing drag queens as one example where gender norms and identity are
played with and manipulated. She asserts that drag subverts the notion of a true gender
identity, because "in imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of
gender itself - as well as its contingency" (Sullivan, 86). She also extends her analysis to
transgender people (by which she means, those who are gender non-conforming) as well.
According to Butler, the fact that transgender people exist serves to show how all gender
is a performance. Relating it back to her core concepts, she asserts that the transgendered
subject "brings into relief" the performativity of gender (Stryker, 262). However, in a
marked departure from her views on drag and transgender people, she states that
transsexuals can only offer "an uncritical miming of the hegemonic [sex/gender system]"
(Butler, 131). Where drag and transgenderism seemingly serve to break the connection
between sex, gender, and sexuality, transsexuals rely on a congruence between those
characteristics in order to be read properly. Thus, while drag, transgenderism, and
transsexualism may do so in separate ways, all serve to show how all gender is an act.
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Butler argues that through these three groups of people, we can see that all gender is
constructed and performed.4
Sandy Stone
Post-structural feminism was the dominant theoretical starting point informing a
group of authors who, in response to Raymond, focused their studies on trans people. In
what is popularly taken to be the start of queer/trans theory, The Empire Strikes Back,
author Sandy Stone calls for a rebuttal to Raymond's arguments in The Transsexual
Empire via a post-structural reading of transsexualism.
Stone's theoretical origins are clear from the very start; the subtitle to her article,
"A Posttranssexual Manifesto", along with her recurring use of the phrase
"posttranssexual" throughout the paper makes it clear that the notion of departure (and
departing from previous dominant modes of thought) will figure heavily in her theory
(Stone, 154). Just as post-structuralism was a response to structuralist thought, so Stone
hopes her paper will allow us to move past the old modes of interpreting and theorizing
about transsexual people. Stone hoped to usher in a new era of writing about
transsexualism, departing from the age where the only texts about trans people were
written by doctors and never by trans people themselves. Thus, she endeavored to refute
the popular conceptions of trans people present in the (up until then radical) feminist
theory through a shift away from medical studies, where non-trans doctors controlled the
nature of the dialogue, and towards texts penned by transsexuals themselves (Stone, 155).
She uses the opportunity presented by autobiographies to show how transsexuals
specifically perform gender. Stone recounts how one woman's autobiography details her
4

While I have presented my analysis of Butler before my analysis of Stone, Butler's comments on
transsexualism in particular were penned years after Stone had written her response to Raymond. Butler's
original statements in Gender Trouble focused solely on drag and transgender people.
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desires: "I wanted the sensual feel of lingerie against my skin, I wanted to brighten my
face with cosmetics. I wanted a strong man to protect me" (Stone, 156). Similar to Butler,
Stone takes this opportunity to point out how transsexuals can uncritically mime the
hegemonic sex/gender system. Stone describes how this woman's story displays
"complicity...in a Western white male definition of performative gender", where the
author "reinforce[s] a binary, oppositional mode of gender identification" (Stone, 156).
Stone is also interested in analyzing autobiographies to discover what sort of
subject has been constituted in these texts and how this construction has occurred (Stone,
155). After detailing a passage from one woman's autobiography, Stone asks us to
consider, "for whom was Lili Elbe constructed? Under whose gaze did her text fall?"
(Stone, 156). Stone uses this opportunity to segue into a discussion of identities and the
fact that doctors who treated trans people placed strict requirements on how a transsexual
identity could be acceptably constructed. She highlights how doctors required that
transsexuals not tell others about their trans status in order to continue receiving
treatment. To follow these orders transsexuals would create alternate histories for
themselves, deftly avoiding any mixture of narratives, evading discussing their past and
current lives in opposite terms. Stone saw these acts, too, as serving to further reinforce
gender binaries (Stone, 158). These contemporary medical standards also precluded the
opportunity for openness, plurality, and diversity in the identities expressed by
transsexuals. In addition to these requirements, transsexuals were also historically
required to unquestioningly recreate narratives where they reinforced gender norms in
order to appease doctors and obtain treatment. Stone recounts these additional standards
that had to be met in order to receive treatment, one of which was appropriately
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responding to the question "Suppose that you could be a man [or woman] in every way
except for your genitals; would you be content?" Stone explains how "there are several
possible answers, but only one is clinically correct" (Stone, 166). Transsexuals were all
expected to express the same dissatisfactions with their bodies, and failure to do so would
result in the withholding of treatment. Stone hoped to destabilize this norm of only a
single shared experience being deemed acceptable and appropriate for transsexuals.
With her response to Janice Raymond's critique of transsexualism, Sandy Stone
introduced a new approach to trans study, one which hoped to expand the options
available to trans people past just being written about by doctors or voicing a single
mandated narrative. She used the popular post-structural concept of performativity and its
rejection of singular narratives to achieve this aim. Because of her article's theoretical
stance, the entirety of the academic movement which would follow would also be
committed to post-structuralist concepts. However, I believe that Stone's response (and its
underlying theoretical standpoint) faces inherent difficulties in the adequate rebuttal of
Raymond's claims. Embracing an unlimited number of trans experiences as equally valid
leads to the broadening of definition of "transgender" to the point that it includes anybody
displaying gender non-conformity, thus reinforcing the notion that women are necessarily
gender conforming. Additionally, I will argue that this theoretical framework produced
the argument that sex is socially constructed, leading to the rejection of the idea that sex
is based on objective realities of the world and necessarily leading to evaluations of
transsexuals which judge them by their political acumen.
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III. My Proposal
As I showed in my detailing of Janice Raymond, feminist theory has faced a
tumultuous history addressing people who change their sex and live opposite what they
were assigned at birth. As noted in Section II above, Raymond's critique has two main
components, stating both:
(1) That transsexuals problematically cling to strict gender roles, and
(2) That transsexuals transition as a result of patriarchal pressure (1979,
16).
Since Raymond's first analysis of the subject, and in the wake of Stone's intervention, the
term "transsexual" has been eschewed in favor of the broader term "transgender", a word
meant to describe the gender non-conformity of the members involved.5 One
characteristic definition of "transgender" asserts it to be:
[an] umbrella term for an imagined community encompassing
transsexuals, drag queens, butches, hermaphrodites, cross-dressers,
masculine women, effeminate men, sissies, tomboys, and anybody else
willing to be interpolated by the term, who felt compelled to answer the
call to mobilization (Stryker 2006, 4).
However, I believe an approach which responds to critics by merely switching to this
definition faces two problems.
First, I will assert that this response's attempt to avoid the original charge of strict
gender conformity by instead asserting that transgender people categorically break
gender roles causes friction with commonly held feminist aims. While such an assertion
5

The term transsexual was originally coined by medical professionals to describe specifically those who
underwent sex reassignment surgery (and delineate them from individuals who did not wish to undergo this
specific procedure). Over time, this term was rejected by activists who deemed this particular distinction
unnecessary and wished to use a vocabulary outside of that created by the medical community. The main
distinction currently deemed important is whether or not one adheres to gender roles; those who do not are
referred to as "transgender". While it is not often used today, I will use the word "transsexual" in this
paper, both to mirror the language used by critics and to be specific when only talking about those who
modify their sex.
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may evade the original critique, it now finds us on the wrong side of a persuasive
argument made by Sally Haslanger. This new definition - one which I will show defines
trans people as being necessarily gender non--conforming, and positions non-trans6 men
and women as necessarily gender conforming - tacitly necessitates and reinforces
problematic statements about women which are only true by virtue of their social
standing.
Second, I will assert that this response fails to address the more pressing concern:
Raymond's claim that physical transitions are motivated by social pressures and gender
norms. I believe this mistaken claim must be addressed and corrected to show how
motivations to transition have a basis in biology. Failure to correct this misunderstanding
will mean continuing to produce theories like one presented by Cressida Heyes, which, I
will argue, mistakenly evaluates physical transitions based on their politically
effectiveness.
IV. Addressing (1): Sally Haslanger
Haslanger On Generics
While our theory must do an adequate job of responding to Raymond's assertions
about trans people, an acceptable response must also meet a second criterion, arising
from Sally Haslanger's piece "Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground". In this piece
Haslanger analyzes generic statements like “sagging pants are cool”, “blacks are more
criminal than whites”, “cows are food”, and “women are more submissive than men”, and
ultimately concludes that we must deny such claims. She first explains that generic
statements are generalizations which omit quantifiers such as "some," "all," or "many"
6

I recognize that the term "cisgender" is typically used to designate someone who is not transgender.
However, to try and avoid inundating the reader with potentially unfamiliar terminology, I will refrain from
using it here.
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(Haslanger 2011, 5). Additionally, generic statements do not make claims about singular,
specific instances of the category mentioned, but rather make claims about the category
in general and say something about the group as an open-ended class (2011, 5). She
believes that analyzing generic statements can be useful, because as humans, "we have a
very basic capacity to sort the world into kinds of things that seem to behave in similar
ways and generics highlight striking or important features that members of these kinds
typically exhibit" (Haslanger 2011, 5). When dealing with generic statements, the
important and pertinent feature is how "they draw heavily on background knowledge and
patterns of inference to highlight a significant property (either characteristic, striking, or
common) of a kind" (Haslanger 2011, 9).
Haslanger is especially interested in the cases where generics are particularly
misleading and initiate negative social consequences (Haslanger, 2011, 6). For instance,
in evaluating the statement “women are more submissive than men”, it may be true that
women defer to men in both work and family life. However, such a statement conveys
more than it might seem to at first glance. Allowing such statements to go unchecked
would promote unintended explanations; they would allow for the implication that the
truth of these statements lies in women's nature, how women are (Haslanger 2011, 26).
For example, in stating that women are more submissive than men, such a statement
obscures the background social conditions which makes it ostensibly true, and thus it is
systematically misleading. Because such a statement would imply that women are by
nature submissive, Haslanger maintains we must reject them (2011, 29). When
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statements have such implications, we can deny the statement as a way to block what the
statement conveys (Haslanger 2011, 13).7
Tension
The term "transgender", as it is currently defined, violates the guideline that
Haslanger has constructed. This tension becomes more evident when analyze at different
ways the word has been used. For instance, Leslie Feinberg self-describes as “a female
who is more masculine than those prominently portrayed in mass culture…Speaking for
myself, my life only comes into focus when the word transgender is added to the
equation” (1998, 7). Feinberg later elaborates, stating that “what makes me transgendered
is that my birth sex – which is female – appears to be in social contradiction to my gender
expression – which is read as masculine” (1998, 69). Through such statements, Feinberg
asserts that ze8 is transgender because hir gender expression differs from what is
normally expected of hir sex.
However, while Feinberg is merely describing hir own experiences, we can also
find instances where this definition of the word is elevated to a categorical truth about
what being transgender is. For instance, Feinberg later states that a transgendered person
is “someone who transcended traditional stereotypes of ‘man’ and ‘woman’” (1998, 63).
Transgender people are defined as those who display an incongruence between “sex and
gender expression”, including masculine females and feminine males (Feinberg 1998, 5).

7

Haslanger allows that in some cases, similar statements can be unproblematic; for instance, she does not
have a problem with saying that “women are oppressed”, or that “blacks in the United States suffer racism”
(2011, 5). She believes that those statements can be unproblematic because either the context cancels the
implicature, or because there is some non-accidental connection between the subject and the description
(ie., women and being oppressed or being black and suffering racism in the US). In these cases, the point of
making such a claim would be to criticize the practice, not to justify oppression or racism. Because these
statements expressly take the overarching social structure into account in their utterances, they do not fall
into the same problematic trap as those generic statements previously evaluated.
8
Feinberg uses pronouns other than "he" or "she".
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Author Kate Bornstein calls for a similar definition of the term transgender, using it to
describe "transgressively gendered" individuals, or "a group of people who break the
rules, codes, and shackles of gender" (1994, 134). Thus, the theorists asserting this broad
definition share the view that a person is transgender if they are not conventionally
masculine or feminine, and that being transgender means breaking from the stereotypical
gender role assigned to one's sex.
This conception of the term conflicts with Haslanger's principle when we realize
that it, in turn, must mean that non-transgender men and women are stereotypical in their
gender expressions. The stances presented above never make outright claims about what
women are like; these statements never directly make assertions about women like those
analyzed in Haslanger’s piece. However, such statements tacitly rely on a definition of
(non-trans) women which necessitates they be stereotypically gendered.
Put another way, the argument proceeds as follows. The proposed umbrella
definition asserts that transgender people (including drag queens, transsexuals, masculine
women and feminine men) all share the characteristic of being gender non-conforming,
or having a gender expression which is different from what is expected of one's sex, and
that anyone who has this characteristic may be considered transgender. Thus, for these
authors, being transgender means both being gender non-conforming and acting in ways
not typical of men and women, not showing the sex-gender congruence expected of either
sex. Thus, a person is either not-trans or is gender non-conforming and expressing a sexgender incongruence. For Feinberg and Bornstein, then, displaying sex-gender
incongruence, not partaking in the gender role stereotypically associated with their sex, is
not characteristic of non-trans men and women.
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One may object that Feinberg and Bornstein's statements above never directly
state that women or men are some certain way ("women are x"), thus a modified
definition is never justified. In fact, one may point to the appeals to societal expectations
in these statements as proof that these definitions themselves are socially created.
Because of this, it may be said that these theorists' statements already refer to society's
expectations of men and women in their definitions of transgender, thus not implying that
men or women are naturally gender-conforming. However, while Feinberg for instance
uses society to ground hir status as transgender, this appeal does not do the work
necessary to diffuse the worries raised by Haslanger. Feinberg's statement still does not
avow that women only are a certain way because of society, it merely grounds these
identities (trans or not-trans) in relation to what society expects. In other words,
Feinberg's account does not say that women possess this congruence because of society,
just that society expects it. Thus, while such statements might not take the form of the
statements that Haslanger is worried about ("women wear lipstick"), they still reinforce
the idea that women possess a congruence between sex and gender and allow for the
impression that women possess this congruence naturally.
By asserting that they are not women in virtue of the fact that they do not partake
in the gender role stereotypically associated with their sex (ie., by the fact that they do not
wear makeup), these authors maintain that partaking in these roles (ie. wearing makeup)
is relegated to non-trans men and women. So while they may have gone unstated, we can
see that the arguments presented by these authors rely on the types of statements that
Haslanger takes issue with, statements that are only true due to social mandates and
trends. After such a definition of "transgender", the only people left in the non-trans
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categories of “man” and “woman” are those who stereotypically adhere to gender roles.
This broad usage of “transgender”, then, necessitates that theorists have situated men and
women as being necessarily stereotypical in their gender expression. By this view, one is
only a man or woman if they conventionally, stereotypically adhere to their prescribed
gender role. Though it may not explicitly endorse them, this broad definition of the term
transgender relies upon (and thus perpetuates) notions about men and women which are
only true by virtue of our current social structure and its strict gender roles.9
To avoid this problem, I believe we must abandon this broad definition. I contend
that a response to Raymond which implements the umbrella definition of this word must
be rejected in order to avoid the criticisms raised by Haslanger.
Additional Considerations
For the reason presented above I believe it is harmful to define trans people as
being categorically gender non-conforming. However, there are further considerations
that can also motivate a refusal to make categorical statements about trans people as
being either gender conforming or gender non-conforming. I believe that it is inaccurate
to state that transsexuals tend to either conform or resist gender roles, since they do not
appear to categorically sway either way. As a group, they neither uphold nor break-down
gender roles; one can find transsexuals who do either. In fact, debating this point and

9

One might argue that you could avoid this problem by making transgender into a socially-defined word,
asserting that it's possible to use "transgender" in such a way that it highlights the social conditions
surrounding being trans. This move would mean that the definition would no longer be objectionable under
Haslanger's framework, since she believes such statements to be unproblematic. However, since this was
Raymond's original critique in the first place, such a move would do nothing to refute her claims, and
would not reach my overall goal.
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holding either of these polar stances has come to be seen as trite by authors within queer
theory. 10
Author Julia Serano addresses the commonly held idea that transsexuals are
strictly gender-conforming and points out that the theorists espousing either of these
claims have generally only experienced limited interaction with the population they are
writing about. Serano notes that authors who have interacted with transsexuals for longer
periods of time typically come to reject both of these stances, offering Anne Bolin as an
example. Bolin found that of the transsexual women she got to know:
Contrary to the stereotype of transsexuals as hyperfeminine, reveling in
traditional notions of womanhood to a greater extent than genetic women,
the transsexuals in this population were not admirers of stereotypical
womanhood. They were keenly aware of the feminist movement ... and
represented styles of dressing as diverse as the female population emulated
(Serano, 153).
Author Henry Rubin comes to a similar conclusion after interviewing twenty-two
transsexual men for his book Self Made Men. He observes that "transsexual men may
confirm or undercut the hegemonic version of normative maleness and masculinity in this
culture. Transsexuals per se are neither essentially gender normative nor essentially
gender subversive", ultimately concluding based on his findings that there is "a wide
10

Author Henry Rubin is blunt in his critique of this debate. He believes that "up until now, it seems as if
the most pertinent question about transsexuals is whether they subvert the heteronormative gender order.
We view transsexuals only as either revolutionaries or traitors. ...They are either in service to a greater
cause or they betray that cause" (with that cause being "the overturning of the present configuration of
gender, sex, and sexuality that configures and constrains institutions and individuals"). He continues,
saying "this sort of scholarship has fetishized transsexuals, either as 'gender revolutionaries' or as 'gender
traitors.' It refuses to acknowledge that transsexuals are a heterogeneous group. Some subvert gender or
sexuality; some do not. Most combine subversion of and conformity to dominant cultural beliefs about
gender, sex, and sexuality. The fetishistic appropriation of transsexuals or the critique of false
consciousness makes it impossible to grasp the meaning of their social psychological experience" (163).
Rubin thus questions the motives of those theorists who have been so intent on maintaining that
transsexuals are gender non-conforming. He believes that, as opposed to what some theorists may be
aiming towards with their appraisals, we should not be "judging transsexuals as a group by their
commitment to the gender revolution" (164).

22

range of ways to be transsexual; some subvert hegemonic masculinity and some do not"
(Rubin, 173). He thus proposes "a ban on the question of whether transsexualism and
transsexuals are unequivocally subversive or hegemonic" (Rubin, 164).
I believe, just as these authors have argued, that to highlight the gender nonconformity of transsexuals would mean to focus on accidental qualities held by only a
portion of its members, traits which are only coincidentally occurring among a segment
of the population and not shared by all of its constituents. The act of modifying one’s sex
concerns a characteristic separate from one’s gender, so the gender conformity or nonconformity of those who alter their bodies presents itself as an unimportant and unrelated
matter. 11
As I have shown here, there are multiple reasons to reject the current response to
Raymond’s criticism. Attempting to block her critique by shifting the definition of
"transgender" to include gender non-conforming people (and therein making gender nonconformity the defining characteristic of the group) is a problematic avenue, and fails to
address the more significant misunderstanding of transsexualism presented in Raymond’s
paper.
V. Addressing (2): Cressida Heyes
In this section I will show how the original response to Raymond took a wrong
turn in failing to address her claim that people transition as a result of societal pressures.
Allowing for this understanding of physical transitions means that feminist theories will
retain normative judgments of actions which are in fact not problematic and which should
11

In addition to this, shifting to a new definition would also mean that the term would fail to capture a
segment of the population which had previously fallen under the term, specifically those transsexuals who
have physically transitioned but are gender conforming. Making gender non-conformity the defining
characteristic for who is "trans" would means that these transsexuals are no longer trans, which would seem
to go against our intuitions.
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not be evaluated by their reaching ethical aims. I argue that, rather than comparing these
procedures to ones like breast augmentation, as Cressida Heyes does, a more accurate
comparison would relate them to procedures like reconstructive surgery. I will end by
explaining that Heyes's article will serve as an example for feminist theories in general; I
argue that all theories must incorporate this understanding into their approaches because
the consequences facing Heyes’s argument will face any theory that relies on the same
mistaken causal belief. Before undertaking this endeavor, I will first show where Heyes's
theory gets its theoretical underpinnings from arguments asserted by queer theorists.
Queer Theory's Understanding of Motivation
The current trend within trans theory maintains that sex is just as socially
constructed as gender. Linda Martin Alcoff summarizes this line of thought in her book
Visible Identities, explaining how it is often argued that sex is not in fact a given entity,
but rather is just as socially constructed as gender. Indeed, the existence of transsexuals is
often thought to prove how a socially-based understanding of sex is necessary.
Transsexuals are often introduced to discussions about sexual dimorphism and the
definitions of "man" and "woman" because they seemingly prove that the line between
male and female is blurry; the fact that people sometimes need to transition is often
invoked to further an argument which paints men and women as strictly social categories.
Theorists Monique Wittig, Collette Guillamin, and Judith Butler, who voiced opposition
against the idea that "a human group may be physically (or as common sense would put
it, 'objectively') specific in itself, independently of its relationships or practice", instead
argued that sex and gender are "not objective or independent of human belief systems and
thus not natural" (Alcoff 2006, 157). They collectively argue that transsexuals' "absence
of correlation between actual sexed characteristics and sexed identities" supports the idea
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that sexual categories are not determined by objective features in the world, and thus
concluded that sex is no less a product of culture than gender is. Transgender activists
then used these theoretical advances to enact a "major cultural transformation" to sexed
identity, building upon these theorists' arguments to support the notion that sexual
categories are merely social categories (Alcoff 2006, 158).
However, while the premise to the arguments presented by Butler et al. may be
correct, it is not true that the conclusion necessarily follows. In other words: trans people
certainly do present a case where a person's sexed characteristics do not correlate to their
sexed identity. However, even with this information, it is still possible for these
categories to be independent of human belief systems; it is not necessarily the case that
"sex is no less a product of culture than gender is" simply based on the existence of
transsexualism (Alcoff 2006, 159).
It is still possible that some alternate understanding of the physical world could
offer an explanation for the experience of having a sexed identity which is contradicted
by one's body. In other words, while transsexuals claim they know their appropriate sex,
these claims do not necessarily mean that one's sexed identity cannot be caused by some
material (rather than social) reality. In actuality, trans people could be seen as proving
this fact. In her book Whipping Girl, Julia Serano argues that this need to physically
transition could be biologically based and pre-determined from birth. In her view, trans
people have brains which are "hardwired to expect our bodies to be female or male,
independent of our socialization or the appearance of our bodies" (Serano 2007, 81).
While such a claim might appear metaphorical, Serano maintains that a literally alternate
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hardwiring is in fact present in transsexuals.12 Under this conception, trans people
illustrate that one is born with a sex that one can subconsciously feel oneself to be.13
Serano bases this assertion on studies where male infants born with intersex
conditions were surgically reassigned and raised as female. In the majority of such cases
these children eventually came to identify as male, despite their upbringing. Most of the
children felt a marked amount of distress at being raised female, insisting that this
categorization was inaccurate, and this distress dissipated when they were allowed to
both live as men in society and physically transition away from the female sex. While
such cases do not deal directly with transgender children, they do demonstrate that the
hardwiring of one's brain may override both socialization and genital sex (Serano 2007,
80). Thus, it seems plausible to use these findings to assert that this phenomenon also
occurs in transsexuals and is the driving factor behind their desires to transition. Similar
to what Serano has presented, Dick Swaab offers that "in the human brain, structural
differences have been described that seem to be related to gender identity14", and more
confidently states how "observations in human subjects with genetic and other disorders
show that direct effects of testosterone on the developing fetal brain are of major
importance for the development of male gender identity" (Swaab, 301). Studies into these
claims will surely need to be investigated further to ensure they can be substantiated.
However, if observations such as these are accurate, then trans people would not
12

Serano states in her book that some studies have examined "a small, sexually dimorphic region of the
brain known as the BSTc. Researchers found that the structure of the BTSc region in trans women more
closely resembles that of most women, while in trans men it resembles that of most men" (2007, 81).
13
Julia Serano develops this concept of a "subconscious sex" in her book Whipping Girl. She uses the term
to capture "the gender we subconsciously feel ourselves to be" (Serano 2007, 78). Similar to what I am
suggesting here, she explains that "perhaps the best way to describe how my subconscious sex feels to me
is to say that it seems as if, on some level, my brain expects my body to be female" (Serano 2007, 80).
14
While scientists often use the term "gender identity", it is not generally meant to capture what feminists
are talking about when they discuss "gender". For medical professionals, this term typically holds a
meaning more similar to Serano's term "subconscious sex".
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necessarily go so far as to show that one's sex is not pre-determined; they would merely
demonstrate that in some instances one's sex is not immediately obvious.
Thus, while activists have argued that sex is socially constructed in order to bring
about a cultural transformation, arguments for such a claim are not conclusive, nor is it
apparent that theories of sexed identity which posit a biological influence necessarily do a
disservice to trans people. From the presented evidence we cannot concretely conclude
that no objective feature in the world founds sexual categories, just that the previously
decided upon foundation - the notion that one's sexed identity is always accurately
reflected by their sexed characteristics - was inadequate. Sexual categories could instead
just be based on some other objective feature in the world, such as a combination of one's
sexed characteristics and the brain wiring resulting from hormonal influence in fetal
development. Thus, there still exists theoretical and scientific support for the idea that sex
is an objective reality (albeit different from how we currently conceive of it).
Heyes on Motivations
With that understanding in mind, I will now turn to address Cressida Heyes's
article. Heyes sets out to construct a theory which she thinks will mend the relationship
between trans theorists and feminists, two groups who she has noticed have historically
had tensions. The aim of her paper is to strike a compromise between these groups by
retaining some of the ethical imperatives present in feminist theory while also arguing
that trans people are not as ethically suspect as some feminists have asserted in the past.
This project necessitates that Heyes highlight how physically transitioning can be
politically progressive while disapproving or downplaying the transitions which might be
found to be politically suspect by feminists. She does this by pointing out that the trans
community is composed of more than just those transsexuals whom feminist theorists
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have critiqued; in fact, Heyes asserts that most trans peoples' journeys do not include
having full sex reassignment surgery and then living quietly as their intended sex for the
rest of their lives, the practice that Raymond had taken issue with. Heyes then spends
some time highlighting how these trans people who had been overlooked in prior theories
do not succumb to those ethical quandaries which ensnared the transsexuals undergoing
more normative transitions. However, I will argue that this response to Raymond
presents a problem; it still involves normatively evaluating acts which are unsuitable for
evaluation. As part of this argument I will first show that her argument paints physical
transitions as being motivated by social norms.
Evidence of This "Socially Constructed" Understanding
Heyes's theory implies a tacit portrayal of physical transitions which paints them
as wholly socially motivated and not influenced by one's biological make-up. She first
displays this belief when she states that she can understand what might motivate one to to
physically transition, believing it is necessary for everyone to seek out a home as a
gendered or sexual being since "community, recognition, and stability are essential to
human flourishing" (Heyes, 1097). She elucidates this idea further when she tries to
better understand trans modifications by relating them to things that non-trans people
experience and comparing physical transitions to certain socially motivated actions.
Heyes believes that transsexual people are feeling discomforts similar to "genetic women
who ponder the wisdom of breast implants, crash diets, or body building", asserting that
people who entertain these considerations are "hardly different" from someone who feels
that they needs to change their sex (Heyes, 1116).
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However, while statements like this final comparison may assert the transsexual
to be no worse than somebody contemplating undergoing plastic surgery, it
simultaneously places them to be as similarly culpable as somebody considering these
acts. Bundled in with this attempt to gain sympathy for those who physically transition
comes the assessment that they would be acting in ways that support some ethically or
politically problematic end. I will now turn to investigate more fully how her theory
implies judgments of certain physical transitions.
Judgments of Physical Transition
Certain physical transitions are still deemed problematic in Heyes's theory since,
similar to procedures like breast augmentation, they are acts undertaken by agents who
may not fully understand their own motives.15 Similar to those cases, those who
undertake these actions would do well to interrogate their motives and should be more
conscious of the power structures that caused their desires. We see that this is her goal
through her failure to hold as equally problematic those whose transitions involve
weakening the norms that the medical community (along with the greater western
society) imposes. Thus Heyes distinguishes between those normative transitions which
had been the sole object of Raymond's critique and more non-normative interventions,
which she believes are paths taken by most of the trans community. Heyes introduces this
distinction in her explanation of how Raymond did not have a nuanced enough
understanding of trans people in her original critique; not everybody transitions in the
manner she had thought. Particularly, Heyes states that Raymond's assessment of
15

Heyes begins by comparing physical transitions to plastic surgery in an attempt to humanize those who
undergo them and lessen the ethical evaluations made of them by feminists. Her comparisons are no doubt
well-intentioned; she makes them in an attempt to normalize physical transitions which will hopefully
convince some feminists to stop people from judging them so harshly.
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transsexuals has placed an "emphasis on the surgically (re)constructed transsexual",
which "obscures the multiplicity of transgendered lives" (Heyes, 1106). Heyes believes
the group's composition has changed, and Raymond's understanding of transsexual
people presents itself to be no longer accurate. Currently, Heyes believes that, in general
"increased access to critical information about medical procedures, a growing political
consciousness, and expanded community has caused those trans people who do seek
medical services to be increasingly concerned with the limits of SRS as a route to an
authentic identity" (Heyes, 1116). In doing so, Heyes focuses on those trans people
previously overlooked by Raymond and uses them to show that some do not physically
transition in problematic ways.
Thus, Heyes is intent on informing the reader that not all transsexuals want to
undergo full sex reassignment surgery and live quietly as the intended sex. Highlighting
this fact could primarily act as a way for Heyes to disprove certain statements and
assumptions made by Raymond; however, she also utilizes this distinction in order to
show how some who physically transition show promise and move in the right direction
towards ideal political actions.
Later aspects of Heyes's argument rely on acknowledging the political
shortcomings of those people who do fully and normatively transition, and asserting that
the people who undertake more politically savvy interventions are acting in more
praiseworthy ways. She states that:
I have been impressed by the political commitment and sophistication of
many trans activists. The politically resistant choices that trans people are
making often do challenge the terms of medical practice, as well as the
depoliticized queer aestheticism that some feminists find objectionable
(Bolin 1994; Caliﬁa 1997, 221–44; Feinberg 1998). Many FTMs in
particular refuse surgeries, especially lower-body surgeries. The cosmetic
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and functional inadequacy of phalloplastic techniques is un-doubtedly a
major element of this resistance (and a valid one: who wants a lousy
outcome to their surgery?), but resistance is also motivated by the feminist
recognition that the penis does not make the man (Devor1998, 405–13;
Cromwell 1999, 112–17, 138–40).16

Combining Heyes's focus on the previously overlooked trans identities with her
statements that non-normative physical transitions are politically committed and
sophisticated, one is left with the understanding that a trans person exemplifying the
historical conception of transsexualism is less than ideal. While such individuals are
perhaps not blameworthy, they are neither politically committed nor sophisticated. Heyes
subtly utilizes her introduction of that "multiplicity of transgendered lives" to draw focus
away from those transsexuals whom would be viewed less favorably by feminists. Thus,
she asserts a theory whereby the typically acting transsexuals are still seen as unaware of
their complicity in systems of oppression, but some other politically minded trans people
are moving in the right direction. Those trans people who undergo non-normative
transitions are spared such severe analysis, since they are seen as at least taking a step in
the right direction, taking some measures to fight back against the structure which
necessitated their desires or actions in the first place.
Thus, in her attempt to be sympathetic to trans people, Heyes's theory allows that
some are still succumbing to politically or ethically problematic norms. To undergo a
normative physical transition is to act in a way as unreflective and apolitical as
undergoing cosmetic plastic surgery; complicit with overarching systems of repression
16

In addition to the objections raised in this section, I believe Heyes makes a few inaccurate statements in
this quote. First, I believe her statement that "many" FTMs refuse lower-body surgeries misrepresents the
fact that, according to the sources Heyes cites, most FTMs only do not pursue these avenues because of
lack of access. Additionally, her statement that phalloplasties are "cosmetically and functionally
inadequate" is no longer accurate; with current medical technology this procedure often produce results that
attain much of the appearance, sensation, and functionality of non-trans male's genitals with low
complication rates.
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and inattentive to the relations that hold stigmatized concepts of 'woman' in place (Heyes,
1113). Undergoing non-normative procedures, on the other hand, can at least mitigate
some of these consequences.
In the grand scheme of feminist theories that evaluate physical transitions,
Heyes's article shifts from a stance which paints all physical transitions as bad to one
where some are better than others, asserting that people who transition in certain ways
have raised their political acumen and worked towards political imperatives. Just as
Heyes believes the politically reflective plastic-surgery-hopeful would ideally reconsider
and forego surgery, the politically reflective trans person would ideally forego physical
transitions wholesale. But if they feel they must, they would do well to reconsider
transitioning fully and normatively, and instead undertake alternate procedures which at
least take some steps to dismantle the power structures which produced them.
Better Comparisons
I believe that these ethical evaluations arise from a misunderstanding of the
underlying cause of the desire to physically transition. If we cease to view this desire as
socially motivated and rightfully view it as having a biological component, we can see
that no transition should be evaluated by its meeting certain political goals; even
normative transitions should be seen as posing no ethical problem. I will illustrate this
point by asserting that transitions would be more appropriately understood when
compared to acts which face no ethical scrutiny in feminist theory.
As I showed in the introduction to this section, there is support for the argument
positing a biological basis for one's sexed identity, as illustrated by individuals who were
forcibly reassigned and raised as the opposite sex from infancy. I believe that most
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people, in hearing about such individuals, would feel no hesitancy in declaring that they
have acted in ways unmotivated by society, simply endeavoring to maintain congruence
between their internal sense of sex and their sexed characteristics. I believe that
transsexuals undergoing physical transitions are acting similarly; they are also
undertaking actions to maintain congruence between their internal sense of sex and their
sex characteristics. Thus, just like those intersexed youth who had been spared judgment,
people who transition should be seen as acting unproblematically. Just as it would be
wrong to judge the medical interventions undertaken by intersex adolescents for their
political effects, so the physical transitions undertaken by transsexuals should not be seen
as apt targets of criticism.
However, I recognize that some may be wary of this comparison; since research
into this area is still ongoing one may be hesitant to endorse such an analogy. If one is
tentative to accept the similarity of these situations then another comparison might be
found more suitable. For another example, consider an act like breast reconstruction after
a mastectomy. This procedure is not viewed as comparable to plastic surgeries like breast
augmentation; such an operation is simply seen as recreating body parts which were lost
due to illness. Thinking of this act as somehow ethically suspect or politically uncouth
would seem uncalled for, and this is reflected in the literature; texts which critically
evaluate plastic surgery generally withhold judgment of reconstructive surgery. In
contrast to their attitudes towards breast augmentation, theorists would not consider it
appropriate to pass judgment on those who faced a need to change their body as a result
of some unfortunate medical condition. In these cases the motives are clear and
unproblematic, thus the acts themselves are not seen as necessitating evaluation.
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Connecting this back to trans people - it would seem that if one is unwilling to accept that
physical transitions are motivated by biological factors, it is still not evident these acts
must be viewed and judged as politically regressive and unsophisticated. Instead, one
could forego judging the political efficacy of physical transitions by bypassing the subject
of motivation entirely. Transitions do not need to be seen as either suspect for their
origins in society or acceptable because their origins in biology; they can simply be seen
as acceptable due to their ability to maintain the physical and mental health of those who
undertake this course of action.
For another example, consider a medical intervention such as hormone
replacement therapy. Non-trans men with hypogonadism do not produce enough
testosterone on their own and thus must undergo testosterone replacement therapy (TRT)
to restore their hormone levels to a normal range (Pinsky, 2010). Such a treatment is
instinctively seen as medical in nature and unproblematic, and is not critiqued as having
any political or ethical ill-effects. A transsexual man will also typically undergo this
treatment, and for much the same reason: his body, similarly, does not produce enough
testosterone on its own and so TRT must be undergone to maintain healthy male hormone
levels. Extending Heyes's analysis of breast augmentation to include endocrinological
management, an understanding of these actions which places them as socially motivated
would necessitate holding ethical and political standards for transsexuals which are not
imposed upon non-trans individuals. 17 However, remaining silent on the topic of
motivation and instead viewing these acts as necessary to maintain the physical and
17

Heyes does not expound upon the political effects of hormone replacement therapy for transsexuals as
much as procedures like breast augmentation, but I believe she would in fact evaluate these procedures
similarly. She views them similarly enough to group them together, when she states that "in making
decisions about hormones, surgery, passing, and gender conformity, trans people—especially if they are
feminists—face ethical and political dilemmas" (1116).
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mental health of transsexual people would highlight the fact that these actions are not in
and of themselves problematic.
Acts such as I have just detailed, when pursued by non-trans individuals, are the
very same procedures as those undergone by transsexuals who physically transition. Yet
when undergone by non-trans individuals, they are not considered socially motivated and
are not evaluated by their ability to break down oppressive structures. They are
commonly just as necessary to maintaining the well-being of the individual in question,
either restoring the natural appearance of one's body or maintaining healthy biological
functions. These acts are not judged for their inability to break down oppressive
structures because they are never seen as being caused by those structures in the first
place. In order to avoid placing inappropriate political goals onto those who physically
transition, we should shift away from viewing transsexuals' procedures as motivated by
oppressive social structures.
Generalizing
It is not only Heyes's account which will have to face these problematic
consequences. I believe that they will necessarily accompany any account which
continues to frame physical transitions as a response to patriarchal society. Attempts to
reconcile a socially motivated understanding of these acts with ethical theories prizing the
dismantling of oppressive structures will continually result in normative judgments of
those physical transitions which are seen as inadequately resistant.
VI. Conclusion
As I showed in Section II, Raymond's critique had two main assertions. She
believed both
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(1) That transsexuals problematically cling to strict gender roles, and
(2) That transsexuals transition as a result of patriarchal pressure.

The original response propagated by trans activists addressed this first objection. In
section IV I showed why the current response has problematic conflicts feminist theory.
Because the current conception of "transgender" responds by instead asserting that
transgender people are gender non-conforming, it tacitly necessitates and reinforces
problematic statements about women which are only true by virtue of their social
standing. This conflicts, I have argued, with an important guideline defended by Sally
Haslanger. In order to resolve this tension with Haslanger while still responding to
Raymond, I propose that we respond to (1) by maintaining that trans people are neither
categorically gender conforming nor gender non-conforming.
I believe that the more necessary assertion which should be made is in response to
Raymond's objection (2). Failing to address this point means a continued failure to realize
that a biological component motivates physical transitions. In Section V I demonstrated
how this misunderstanding allows for problematic normative evaluations of physical
transitions, which conflicts with our intuitions about what acts can or should be viewed as
bearing some social, ethical, or political imperative. While I have only focused on
Heyes's article here, I believe this would be an implicit facet of any such theory which
fails to refute this notion of a biological influence. If one believes that resisting
patriarchal gender norms is an important aim in feminist theory - as Heyes certainly does
– then one should not be sympathetic to any account which proclaims that people
physically transitioning is wholly uproblematic. Thus, so long as the actions undertaken
are believed to be born out of a social motive, theorists will continue to judge physical
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transitions by their political effects and hope trans people will act in a way consistent
with feminist political aims.
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